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Madagascar has a tradition of agricultural trade (coffee, vanilla, cloves). In the 90s, the 
country started developing non-traditional exports, such as lychees, to the European Union 
(EU), thereby generating substantial cash revenues for small producers. In 2005, access to the 
EU market became more difficult, due to more stringent quality requirements and to the 
growing use of the private retailer standard GlobalGAP. Whereas the empirical literature on 
private standards presents GlobalGAP either as a success story or a threat for small producers, 
the case of Madagascar exhibits a specific dynamics: after booming in 2007, GlobalGAP is 
actually collapsing. The aim of this article is to disentangle the mechanisms of this evolution 
and to draw some conclusions regarding market access enhancement through private 
standards. This work is based on semi-structured interviews carried out with all stakeholders 
of the export chain, government agencies and programs supporting lychee production and on 
weekly data on lychee trade flows (2001-2010). Using a global value chain approach, we first 
show the importance of the chain structure: importers are identified as lead-firms (conversely 
to most studies dealing with private certification) in an environment characterized by low 
competition at the international level. We then evaluate the role of donors and trade 
facilitators in the promotion of GlobalGAP. After giving evidence for the collapse of 
GlobalGAP, we assess what is left of the GlobalGap procurement system once it has been 
abandoned: stabilization of the relationship between exporters and producers and thus 
enhanced traceability, upgrading of private marketing infrastructures, improved management 
discipline. We conclude that in the Madagascar lychee chain, although GlobalGAP had little 
impact on market access, its implementation produced beneficial side-effects for small 
producers.  
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Introduction: Standards, donors and rural development 
  
Since the 90s, recurring food safety failures3 have raised consumer awareness and concerns 
about food safety in industrialized countries (Henson and Caswell, 1999). As a consequence, 
public and private standards regulating the production process and handling of food were 
adopted to reduce risks at the consumer level. In this context, flows of fresh products from 
developing to developed countries are under close scrutiny since they are viewed as riskier 
than local production due to weak domestic legislation and monitoring of food safety 
(Unnevehr, 2000). Alongside public regulations that deal with this problem by setting 
standards for imported products, private standards were also created to mitigate reputational 
and commercial risks of the private sector (Henson and Reardon, 2005). Moreover, under 
strict liability rules, food handling firms are liable for injuries caused by defective products, 
regardless of where the food safety problem originated. As a result of being asked to prove 
that they have taken all reasonable precautions to ensure food safety, they impose specific 
standards on their suppliers, behaviors and traceability (Loader and Hobbs, 1999). Finally, 
private standards were shown to transpose performance standards (e.g. maximum residues 
limits) into process standards (Humphrey, Henson, 2010) that set a practical guide of conduct, 
thereby increasing the probability of actually meeting the performance standards.  
However, the literature shows that the impacts of standards are ambiguous. On the one hand, 
standards are supposed to increase the competitiveness of exporting countries by reducing 
transaction costs and to enhance consumer confidence (Jaffee and Henson, 2004). Moreover, 
standards may be seen as codified behaviors that help food operators align their requirements 
with international ones, and thus alleviate information asymmetries regarding food quality. 
On the other hand, standards are increasingly regarded by some as a potential obstacle to 
trade, as fixed and recurring costs of compliance may undermine long term competitiveness. 
Indeed, several studies emphasize the difficulties faced by developing countries in complying 
with the food safety standards set by industrialized countries (Reardon and Timmer, 2007). 
Compliance costs4 are partly viewed as insurmountable barriers to trade, especially for small 
producers (Graffam et al., 2007).  
As a consequence, considerable donor attention (e. g. USAID, GTZ, DFID) has been directed 
at building export capacity, both within the public and private sectors (Humphrey and Navas-
Aleman, 2010). Such interventions aim at reducing poverty by improving the access of 
smallholders to global markets. In this respect, horticulture is an important sector that 
generates high expected revenues per unit of land (Weinberger and Lumpkin, 2007) and is 
very labor intensive. The general framework within which such interventions take place is 
that of aid for trade (Humphrey and Navas-Alemán, 2010). In this article, we focus on how 
the potential obstacle presented by non-tariff measures induces donors to help producers and 
exporters meet market requirements. Stimulating high-value exports is viewed as a pro-poor 
development strategy (Aksoy and Beghin, 2005; World Bank, 2008; Swinnen et al, 2008), 
based on the promotion of smallholder5 and on the inclusion of smallholders in high-value 
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global chains. However, little is said in the literature about the efficiency of those 
interventions. Specifically, two main questions are worth considering: first, how efficient are 
pro-trade interventions aimed at helping overcome non-tariff barriers (Maush et al., 2006; 
Jaud and Cadot, 2011)? Second, if they are efficient, do pro-trade interventions enhance pro-
poor development (as it is presented by the donors)? This question is important as 
interventions may in the end prove to be detrimental to small-scale holders who fail to comply 
with the standards (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Minot and Ngigi, 2004).  
Donors and private standards: empirical evidence 
 
The empirical literature directly concerning the role of donors in the adoption of private 
standards by agricultural producers in developing countries is scarce. However, they are 
mentioned in several studies where the institutional environment is taken into account.  
First, it is shown that the scheduling of GlobalGAP adoption is important and that donors 
should adapt to it when targeting smallholders. In fact, levels of investment are reported as 
high and they differ according to farm structure (Maush et al, 2006). However, the returns to 
certification are known to be low. GlobalGAP is a business-to-business standard: it is not 
communicated directly to the consumer but is used to stabilize market access by enhancing 
information over quality (Fulponi, 2006). In Kenya, Afsaw et al. (2009) conclude to the 
relative advantage faced by large-scale producers regarding GlobalGAP adoption. Even 
though labor is less costly in smallholdings, supervision costs are proved to be far higher. The 
break-up point for small producers is over a year after that of large producers. The question of 
the maturity of the investment and donors’ intervention in it is thus important. In particular, 
some analyses emphasize the question of the recurring costs (Ashraf, Giné and Karlan, 2009; 
Afsaw et al, 2010). So is that of who bears the costs: in particular, costs can be shared 
between producers and exporters (IIED and NRI, 2008).  
Second, studies emphasize the importance of targeting the help: in Kenya, Ashraf, Giné and 
Karlan (2009) describe a large-scale intervention aimed at helping small producers market 
their products on high-value markets. Because it ignored the existence of the private standard 
GlobalGAP, the program collapsed. In a similar perspective, standard adoption by small 
producers does not only involve the financial costs of investing in physical assets, 
management improvement and training. In the case of GlobalGAP adoption, Okello and 
Swinton (2007) emphasize the importance of collective action (especially under GlobalGAP, 
option 2, see below) that allow smallholders to overcome their disadvantage in terms 
coordination costs to market high volumes.  
Third, authors insist on the importance of adopting a chain perspective: in Kenya, Humphrey 
(2008) underlines the decisive role of exporters in promoting and coordinating the adoption of 
GlobalGAP by small producers (exporters are the decision-makers, whereas small producers 
are followers). Moreover, Henson et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of the assistance 
programs for exporters to turn to GlobalGap certification. Similarly, Jaud and Cadot (2011) 
assess the impact of the European Pesticide Initiative Program in Senegal: the exporter level 
show mixed results regarding the improvement of access to the European market under the 
program, but cannot conclude of the absence of impact at the aggregate level. However, in the 
Senegalese case Maertens and Swinnen (2009) show that GlobalGAP only indirectly benefit 
small producers in the case of fresh fruit and vegetables: the integration of the production by 
downstream operators stimulates the demand for rural labor, but excludes small producers 
from modern supply chains. 
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In Kenya (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000) and in Senegal (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009), the 
dynamics of GlobalGap exhibits a decrease in the number of producers involved in the 
scheme. However, the consolidation of production due to its integration by exporters induces 
allows to stabilize the volumes of the GlobalGAP certified produce directed to the exports. In 
Uganda, even though promoted by numerous donors, GlobalGAP certification never turned 
out to be successful (either in terms of producers or of production) (Diaz et al., 2009). 
Madagascar presents a very specific dynamics for the case of lychee exports: a scattered 
production organization increases the costs of supervision and the difficulties of organizing 
the procurement for exporters therefore decreasing the advantage of GlobalGAP as to access 
markets, especially when the international competition is low. In the rest of this article, we 
depict the evolution of GlobalGAP in Madagascar and the role of donor intervention in it. The 
unexpected withdrawal of donors in 2009 due to the undemocratic coup represents an 
opportunity to assess the importance of programs in GlobalGAP development: we evaluate 
which is the role of the donors and what is left from their intervention. 
 
1. Lychee production and exports from Madagascar  
1.1 The importance of lychees for Madagascar 
In 2000-2004, Madagascar’s agricultural sector accounted for almost 30% of the GDP and 
provided livelihood for over 70% of the population (Sandri et al., 2007). Moreover, the 
agriculture and processed food sector represented as much as 60% of all export earnings for 
the same period. However, while the share of agriculture in GDP grew over time (from 20% 
in 1965), the proportion of exports generated by agriculture declined (90% in 1965).  
This evolution can be related to different trends (Maret, 2007):  
- the liberalization and stabilization programs6 adopted in the 1980s sounded the death-
knell for the marketing agency in charge of setting the prices of the main cash crops 
(vanilla, coffee and cloves). This led to a reduction of Madagascar’s bargaining power 
on world markets after 1993 (Cadot et al., 2008). The end of state regulation led in 
1996 to the collapse of the parastatal UCOFRUIT (Union des Coopératives Fruitières) 
in charge of marketing fresh fruit and vegetables for exports, namely lychees and 
bananas (CITE, 2008); 
- the promotion of export-oriented industries has been strong since 1989, with the 
emergence of export processing zones where enterprises enjoy a large variety of tax 
exemptions. This has led to the development of sectors other than agriculture (e.g. 
textile, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2002). Over the last decade, vanilla, coffee, 
cloves, pepper and cocoa represented respectively 30%, 20%, 14%, 6% and 5% of the 
total value of agricultural exports (Maret, 2007). Recently, the country benefited from 
the development of non-traditional exports such as French beans (Minten et al., 2009), 
and from the development of European outlets in the 1990s.  
With an average volume of 20,000 tons exported each year since 2004 (graph 1), lychee is 
one of the major fresh crops exported by Madagascar. It represents on average 7% of the total 
value of agricultural trade7 flows between 2005 and 2010, and ranks each year among the top 
                                                 
6
 Structural Adjustment Programs were launched in 1985. 
7
 According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) definition. 
5 
 
five export crops, after vanilla and cloves and before cocoa, coffee and green beans8 
(INSTAT, 2011)9.  
 
Graph 1: Exported volumes, lychee, 1983-2010 (tons) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, Comext10  
 
Over the period 2000-2009, lychees from Madagascar accounted in average for roughly 70% 
of the total annual volume of lychees marketed in the European Union, varying according to 
the years from 60% to 80% (Eurostat, Comext). The major alternative origins are: South 
Africa (12% of the total market on average between 2000 and 2007); Thailand (6%); Israel 
(3%) and, with a small but recently growing but unstable share, India and Pakistan (1% each). 
Around 80% of the Malagasy produce is handled by French operators (Gerbeaud, 2010). 
South Africa is Madagascar’s major competitor, although most of South Africa’s exports go 
the United Kingdom. 
1.2 Quality requirements for lychee exports 
Madagascar enjoys duty and quota-free access to the European Union under the Everything 
but Arms (EBA) agreement. However, non-tariff measures can act as barriers to trade, 
especially private certification which is less easy to control than public regulation (Henson 
and Reardon, 2005). Since the mid 2000s, the European regulatory system has evolved 
towards tighter conditions under which produce is marketed on European markets: 
- Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002, implemented in 2005, sets food and feed safety 
requirements and establishes the responsibility of business operators. Statutory 
instruments implementing and enforcing this regulation in domestic laws vary 
according to the countries. In the British Food law (enacted in 1990), the responsibility 
falls upon the retailer, whereas the French regulatory framework stipulates that the 
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importer is legally responsible for the safety of the produce he markets. Downstream 
operators adapted their behavior to secure their procurement, and translated the safety 
requirements up the chain (Fulponi, 2006).  
- Regulation (EC) No. 854/2004, implemented on January 1st, 2006 sets obligations in 
terms of hygiene and requires the application of the HACCP principles (Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point) along the marketing channel.  
- Regulation No. 882/2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of 
compliance with feed and food law specifies that the origin country should be able to 
give information on the structure and functioning on its overall domestic food safety 
regulatory and enforcement system.  
EurepGAP (renamed GlobalGAP in 2007) is a collective private standard for the certification 
of the production process. It was established in 1997 by European food retailers as a response 
to the concerns of European consumers, following several food safety outbreaks. Export 
growers must be certified, either individually (option 1) or as a group (option 2). Certification 
is obtained when passing an on-farm inspection and paying a fee that must be renewed every 
year. Quality management systems must be developed to ensure safe pesticide use, and 
compliance with handling and hygiene standards. Last, exporters must be able to trace 
production back to a specific farm from which it was procured in order to ensure the 
compliance of the product with the standard. Compliance with the standard involves fixed 
costs (e.g. the construction of sheds and of latrines with running water) and recurring costs 
(e.g. record keeping of all farm activities related to the production of the certified crop, both at 
the individual and the group level, monitoring costs).  
The organization of lychee marketing was heavily affected by trade liberalization programs, 
and the business opportunities attracted many occasional operators that built their strategies 
on volumes rather than on quality. The limits and non-sustainability of this system were 
highlighted by the monitoring agencies involved in agriculture and rural development (since 
CTHT, 1998/1999 until CTHT, 2006/2007; MAEP, 2004). Beyond the difficulties to meet the 
norms in terms of fruit size and color, sulphur residues due to postharvest treatment for 
conservation reasons were identified as the major source of concern. Moreover, the question 
of traceability is a major difficulty since Madagascar’s lychee chain exhibits a low level of 
coordination which renders traceability difficult. As a result, the campaigns of 2004/05 and 
2005/06 were reported as “difficult” (CTHT, 2006/07): exporters received low prices and 
shipped low quality produce damaging the reputation of Malagasy lychees on European 
markets. As soon as February 2006, German and British retailers began to require 
GlobalGAP11 certified produce from their importers. In this context (stringent standards, low 
coordination, large number of occasional operators), the role of intermediaries is of major 
importance. 
1.3 Lychee procurement from the EU 
Our analysis is based on: (1) the extensive analysis of the Lychee Letter (La lettre du litchi) 
edited by the CTHT (Centre Technique Horticole de Tamatave) and the reports summarizing 
each campaign (see Appendix 1 for the description of the sources). The information gathered 
in this technical literature comprises: weekly Cost Insurance Fret (CIF) prices reported by the 
French lychee importers for 9 commercial seasons; weekly minimum and maximum prices; 
weekly boat procurements by the European market; opening dates of the cultural season in 
Madagascar; departure and arrival dates of each boat supplying lychee to the European 
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market; and some data on the coalitions of importers for each year. (2) Semi-structured in-
depth interviews carried out in 2010 with stakeholders at each level of the export chain 
(producer-exporter-importer) and interviews with government agencies and programs 
supporting lychee production.  
Using a global value chain approach, we first show the importance of the chain structure: 
importers are identified as lead-firms (conversely to most studies dealing with private 
certification) in an environment characterized by low competition at the international level.  
1.3.1 Lychee production 
Lychee production in Madagascar is estimated at 100,000 tons per year produced by around 
30,000 households (Gerbeaud, 2007). Due to agro-climatic reasons, the production stretches 
southbound along the Eastern coast of the island over 800 km, from an area located to the 
North of Toamasina (Tamatave). More often than not, lychee trees are wild trees grown on 
cultivated plots or in forests. Family farming represents 95% of total production, with 15% of 
total production coming from organized orchards. The remaining 5% are grown on industrial 
farms (CITE, 2008). Households own only a few trees, each of them producing on average 
100 kg of lychees – the major part of their agricultural activity consists in cultivating rice. The 
location of the region where lychees are dedicated to export is dictated by the infrastructure. 
All lychees shipped to the EU leave from the harbor of Toamasina (Tamatave). Considering 
that the sulphur treatment is done best when temperatures are lower (evening, night) and that 
lychees must be harvested early in the morning, the procurement area extends southward 
towards Manohoro and northward towards Soanierana-Ivongo. Most lychees come from the 
region of Brickaville and Fenoarivo (see Appendix 2 for a map). 
The opening of the harvesting period is proposed at the provincial level12 by commissions 
composed of producers, exporters, and representatives of public authorities (institutions in 
charge with food safety and law enforcement). The decision is then set by a provincial decree. 
In addition to climatic conditions and the degree of fruit maturity, social and political events 
are taken into account (e.g. elections). The boats are loaded as soon as the lychees have been 
treated, and the first boat leaves the harbor three to four days after the beginning of the 
campaign. The ability to rapidly harvest and transport the lychees to the treatment plants 
located in Toamasina is highly strategic. As a result, collecting services proposed by 
intermediaries increase dramatically during the harvesting period, thereby expanding the 
agricultural labor market. Actually, many people engaged in other sectors of the economy – 
including urbanites from as far as the capital (Antananarivo), located over 350 km from the 
production zone – are attracted to the area during the harvesting season.  
The role of rural brokers is essential in supplying the exporters with produce. They buy the 
fruits at the farm gate in sometimes remote rural areas, and deliver them to a treatment plant 
where they sell them to the exporter. They face the risk of the produce being rejected by the 
exporter because it does not match the quality requirements (ripeness or size, mostly); or that 
the price eventually paid by the exporter do not cover the transportation cost and farm gate 
prices. The clustering of exporters in a small area generates opportunities for the brokers: the 
produce rejected by one exporter can rapidly (relatively to the number of brokers queuing at 
the plant gate) be proposed to another exporter before lychees are spoiled. Competition 
among exporters is reported to be low. A single publicly-known price prevails and does not 
allow brokers to get any price premium. Indeed, supply is sufficiently large and regular to 
allow all the exporters use efficiently their treatment plant; moreover, information on the 
                                                 
12
 As for litchi production, 3 provinces are concerned: Toamasina, Fianorantsoa and Toliara (from North to 
South)  
8 
 
prices paid by each plant circulates rapidly; and finally, there is no differentiation of products. 
Payments are made at the delivery. If advance payment was made by the exporter, a 
negotiation on the part of the total amount to be reimbursed at each transaction takes place, 
and this part is deduced from the total due by the broker, at the daily price.  
At this point, the exporter takes ownership of the produce. In the plant, the produce is handled 
immediately, or as soon as allowed by the plant capacity. The lychees are sorted to exclude 
the fruits that do not meet the European requirements and packed. Finally the exporter 
proceeds to the sulphur fumigation and transports the pallets to the dock, including the 
domestic registration of the volumes when entering in the harbor, where the importer loads 
lychees in the boats.  
1.3.2.  Lychee procurement 
In Europe, lychee is a typical Christmas product: depending on the beginning of harvesting in 
the production regions and on the logistical constraints, lychees arrive in the European 
harbors a few weeks before Christmas. Over the past 10 years, the first boat delivering 
lychees from Madagascar arrived on average 16 days before Christmas. This date is highly 
variable from one year to the other, ranging from 9 days (in 2003) to 28 days (in 2007). At 
this point of the time, Malagasy lychees delivered via airfreight are already sold since on 
average two weeks on the European market, but they represent very small volumes (around 
400 tons per year). The price difference between air- and seafreight lychees is considerable – 
the typical price of the former varies between 5 and 10 € per kilo13; that of the later range 
from 0.5 and 2.5 € per kilo. Moreover the dynamics of the market for lychees carried by air 
depends on other countries from the Indian Ocean, such as Mauritius. The study will focus on 
the market chain of lychees transported by boat. 
Finally, lychees are sold to final consumers, mostly through supermarkets and as loss-leaders. 
More often than not, they are handled in bulk on the shelves. The segmentation of the product 
on the final European market is not significant, except for the United Kingdom, where lychees 
are sold in smaller packaged quantities (250 or 500 grams). In that respect, lychee has a 
specific position in the tropical market (large volumes marketed mainly in winter). In general, 
the supply and demand of tropical fruits on the European market are highly seasonal (e.g. 
mango, papaya) due to irregularities in the procurement and volatility of consumption (FAO, 
2008). Due to the tight marketing season of lychees (9 to 11 weeks for Malagasy lychees over 
the period 2001-2010) and to the low substitutability of this produce with other fruits during 
the winter season where it has few competitors, lychee is marketed as a mass consumption 
product. Therefore, the main objective of the operators is the regularity of flows and the 
adaptation of the volumes to a fluctuating but predictable demand: with a peak right before 
and for Christmas, followed by a smaller increase during Chinese New year14. Marketing 
strategies are important: the intra-annual price (in constant prices) volatility is 0.34 
(standardized, 0.39), and is namely higher than the inter-annual price volatility (0.29, or  
standardized, 0.28).  
This last observation deeply influences the structure of the supply chain, and gives to 
importers a large weight. 
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2. Business-driven vs. donor-driven dynamics in the lychee chain 
2.1 Chain drivenness and  drivers  
This section aims at presenting the role of importers in structuring the chain. 
We will present elements that show that they are acting as lead firms in the chain: lead firms 
are demonstrating how certain firms set, measure and enforce parameters under which the 
other firms have to operate (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Governance is viewed as the 
process of exercising control along the chain: what has to be produced, when the product has 
to be delivered, in what quantity, how it should be produced, at what price. More often than 
not in agricultural and agro-processing sectors, lead-firms are found to be the buyers.  
The literature distinguishes originally between two types of governance in supply chains: 
“producer-driven” and “buyer-driven” chains. The former where said to be found usually in 
sectors with high technological and capital requirements; the latter generally in more labour-
intensive sectors, where market information, product design, marketing and advertising costs 
set entry barriers for potential lead firms (Gereffi, 1994). According to Dolan, Humphrey and 
Harris-Pascal (1999), international horticultural supply chains with supermarkets as final 
buyers have been orienting towards a “buyer-driven” type of governance, deriving largely 
from supermarkets’ increasing control over information on consumers’ preferences. They 
coordinate supply chains not directly, but externalise a wide range of functions to preferred 
importers-suppliers. However, the recent literature argues that the analysis should move 
beyond this dichotomy in order to capture the evolution of governance in the value chains 
(Sturgeon, 2009). We investigate the role of importers. 
2.2. The role of importers 
Importers are commissioners who do not own the produce, but match sellers (exporters) with 
buyers (most of the time, supermarkets), and sell on behalf of the exporters. In the case of 
lychees, they are in charge of the logistics from Madagascar to the EU. For logistic reasons – 
refeers are the cheapest mean of transportation – they share the boats to optimize the use of 
their capacities. According to the yearly (and unstable) alliances that emerge, one to three 
groups of importers were observed since 2000. The decisions are taken collectively, within 
these groups, regarding the departure date of the boat (full or not), the route to Europe, the 
speed of the boat, and the arrival port in the EU15. From the data (2000-2010), we see that 
their margin of maneuver is substantial: for instance, the trip to Europe takes 10 to 14 days; 
and 1 to 6 boats are used per year. Loading the boats is a strategic decision as well, especially 
for the years when importers didn’t collude: the first boat is leaving 3 to 5 days after  the 
opening date of harvest.  
All these decisions are made according to the state of the European market and the strategies 
of the competing importer groups on other boats, in order to avoid a transitory saturation of 
the European consumption market and subsequent drop of prices. 
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 According to the necessary infrastructure and location in the EU, the most used harbours are: Marseille 
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Concentration of intermediation 
European lychee importers are few in number, when dropping the non significant flows16: 
seven French importers were identified, who belong to the so-called “Rungis group”; one 
German importer and a smaller Belgian one.  
 
Financing  
Controlling the procurement is all the more feasible that importers often offer cash in advance 
to exporters, for them to support the up-front payments to be made (around 20 million euros 
per year): the price of the produce at the first place – they thus enjoy a market power that 
avoid any ex-post renegotiation on who bears the transportation costs; and because, given 
their intermediation role, the payment can be made to the exporter only when the produce is 
sold in Europe. At this point the whole structure of the costs is known.  
 
Quality control 
Importers are involved in self-control private voluntary schemes. They check the quality of 
produce at the arrival point. However, studies show that this initiative is more often than not 
directed towards securing their legal defense if the produce is found not to meet the public 
regulation (Rouvière et al., 2010). 
Moreover, German retailers (Lidl) are strengthening their requirements since 2006; the 
German market represents 30% of the total volumes marketed in Europe. Exporters called for 
international support for certification, in a favourable political environnement.  
 
2.3. The role of donors 
This section draws on the annual reports of the donors and trade facilitators (PIP-ColeACP; 
Bamex-USAID; MCA; IFC and IFAD, see appendix 3 for a description of the data) and on 
the interviews of Malagasy stakeholders involved in their activities (GEL and the 4 major out-
contracted institutions or individuals). 
The intensification of donor intervention took place in 2006/2007 in a context of political 
renewal and business pressure. The national political context was favorable to attracting 
international funding. Indeed, the Madagascar Action Plan17 was launched by the government 
of President M. Ravalomanana in 2005 and targeted the Millenim Development Goals (2012), 
with a proactive program largely advertised at the international level.  
Moreover, the degradation of the reputation of Malagasy lychees on European markets was 
harming the sector (in terms of prices paid to the exporters and rejected shipments). This 
evolution was due to the proliferation of occasional exporters, who did not grade their 
products or invest in quality management procedures for sulphur fumigation. The number of 
exporters thus grew from 30 in 1999/2000 to 38 in 2003/2004 (CTHT, 2006/2007). Moreover, 
as mentioned in section 2.2, the European regulatory system tightened the conditions under 
which produce is marketed on the European markets. Finally, British and especially German 
retailers threatened before the 2006/07 campaign to remove from their shelves all non 
GlobalGAP certified lychees18. The German market represents about 30 % of the total 
                                                 
16
 After New year, imports are made by containers, which allows importers to procure small quantities.  
17
 http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/Alliance/MADAGASCAR%20ACTION%20PLAN.htm  
18
 GlobalGAP certification is one of the requirements of the Cahier des charges which includes a specific 
packaging and MLRs set at 70% of the legal limit as well.  
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volumes marketed in Europe (Eurostat, Comext) and most of the produce is sold by retailers 
who contract with importers on the basis of back-to-back contracts signed in September for 
the next marketing season (as opposed to the French retailers who rely on spot markets or on 
informal day-to-day relationships with the importers). This evolution was considered as an 
important threat by four importers (one German, three French) and they required from 
exporters GlobalGAP certified produce: they lent money to the exporters for them to upgrade 
the infrastructure, invest in post-harvest equipments, and ensure traceability. The cost of 
certification for an exporter is estimated by the donors at 121,000 € for the treatment plant, 
transportation and other investments (collection points and their equipment), regardless of the 
investment made at the production level for 500 tonnes of certified lychees (e.g. 200 to 500 
small producers) (MCA, 2008, Annex, p. 240). This figure is consistent with the estimation of 
the exporters who engaged in GlobalGAP certification and report an investment of about 
100,000 €. The cost of the certification only is about 1,500 €. 
 
The description and timing of the donors’ intervention (Stabex, French cooperation, FIDA, 
BAMEX-USAID, MCA, IFC-World Bank) is reported in appendix 4.  
While donors nominally sign to support the Madagascar Action Plan designed by the government, 
there are no formal central donor coordination mechanisms such as Sector-Wide Approaches 
(SWAps) that encourage joint planning and pooled financing at the sectoral level. However, 
several programs exhibit the same general philosophy and coordinate on similar activities with 
regards the promotion of the GlobalGAP certification. 
2.4. Intervention and outcomes 
2.4.1. The approach: market access, expanding markets and the role of GlobalGap 
The major goal reported by all the donors and trade facilitators is business oriented. They aim 
to expand market penetration in exporting countries and view trade as guaranteeing pro-poor 
growth. Therefore, one of their major actions beside the promotion of certification is to link 
producers to markets by establishing marketing institutions in the region of Tamatave.  
BAMEX supported the activities of the Business Centers Ivohorena (BCIs), marketing 
structures that were funded by the program ERI (2004) and provide producers with business 
services and promote technical and administrative skills at the producer level. MCA 
developed (since 2006) Agriculture Business Centers (ABCs) as a part of its agribusiness 
component plan: however the sectors by BAMEX and the areas covered by the two donors 
overlap only partially. Moreover, the PPRR used its own marketing structures, the Market 
Access Centers (MACs) since 2004 that are buildings managed by a union of producers’ 
organizations and used for storage and processing (status of commercial enterprises): support 
for skill improvement and access to credit is provided by a separate body.  
These marketing structures prove to be important for GlobalGAP certification: in the case of 
BAMEX and MCA, field workers belonging to them support farmers in forming cooperatives 
and negotiating agreements with private sector firms. As financial institutions they provide the 
possibility to secure credit. As marketing institutions, they allow for traceability and storage.  
2.4.2. Business driven: Targeting specific sector 
Market exploration was realized by the donors (PIP, 2002-2003; FIDA 2005; BAMEX 2004-
2005; MCA, 2006-2007) as their intervention was mostly directed towards business activities. 
The lychee sector selected due to its economic weight at the national level (BAMEX, external 
evaluation 2008) or at the local level (PPRR, 2007); the potential impact on a large population 
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(MCA, final report, 2008; PPRR, 2006); the potential for production development: They add 
to this expansion of outlets the opportunity to process lychees and end up with an estimated 
increase in the production of 90% and an increase in the export of 60% (MCA, 2008, p. 123); 
the potential for marketing development/diversification and access to foreign markets (MCA, 
ibid; BAMEX, ibid); the institutional local basis they have/developed (BAMEX, ibid); the 
personal relationship they have (PPRR, ibid); the actual difficulties the sector faces in terms 
of quality management – maintaining market access (PIP, Report, Septembre 2003).  
Their aims are different: MCA aims to promote large-scale production (and thus productivity) 
and therefore is concerned by access to finance and to resources (land and water); BAMEX 
aims to expand exports and thereby the value of the produce, is concerned with sanitary and 
phytosanitary compliance of the produce; PIP promotes behaviours that ensure compliance 
with the EU regulation; IFAD promotes rural development, access to domestic and 
international markets being one of its components.  
In consequence, the role of GlobalGAP is different for these donors: a priority/exclusivity for 
PIP; a component of the sanitary and phytosanitary standards19 to be met for international 
trade for BAMEX; a tool to access some of the foreign markets for MCA; an opportunity 
driven by local demand for IFAD which was mostly a follower in it. 
2.4.3 Business driven: the role of exporters 
 
• Local initiatives  
 
UCOFRUIT, the parastatal agency in charge with coordinating the exports of fresh fruit and 
vegetables, ceased any activity in 1996. However, a Lychee Exporters Association 
(Groupement des Exportateurs de Litchis, GEL) was established in 2001 aiming at 
coordinating the exporters, and rationalizing their procurement of lychees. In 2010, all lychee 
exporting enterprises belong to GEL20. This association aims at organizing the lychee chain: 
discusses and decides on the total volume to be exported (since 2005) to sustain the prices on 
the European market – an informal arrangement among exporters to set quotas; foresees the 
allocation of the space on boats and allocates it to the exporters; promotes the reputation of 
Malagasy lychees (participation to international fairs; intervention in newspapers); claims to 
be representative for the lychee exporters profession, negotiates on their behalf with 
international agencies (IFC21, PIP22, IFC23). 
In April 2006, at the instigation of BAMEX, the stakeholders of the lychee value chain set up 
the lychee value chain coordination group (Plateforme de Concertation de la filière Litchi or 
PCL) (BAMEX, external evaluation, 2008). This structure is composed of 8 types of 
stakeholders (producers, brokers, transporters, technical services producers, financial 
institutions, administration, processors, exporters and consumers. BAMEX worked as 
executive secretary for this institution. The PCL aims at improving the quality of produce 
directed towards export and lobbies in that direction for the introduction of new laws.  
                                                 
19 BAMEX, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, carried out phytosanitary surveillance of the 
lychee producing areas as well during the 2005–2006 season. This involved the training of agents in plant 
protection and quarantine procedures. The access to the US market was thereby the goal. 
20
 http://gelmada.com/  
21
 “The World Bank: Madagascar Country Office E-newsletter”, n° 5-2008, p. 9 
22
 http://pip.coleacp.org/fr/pip/17736-madagascar-au-pays-du-litchi 
 
23
 Samb, 2007 
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• Solicitations for GlobalGAP certification 
 
As a response to solicitations of support from local exporters, BAMEX helped them to 
acquire basic information about GlobalGAP requirements through information sessions and 
searching for certifying agencies (BAMEX, annual report, 2007, p. 5). The meetings brought 
together 13 exporters for the first session, 8 for a second more comprehensive session among 
them 5 requested COLEACP help for preliminary study to comply with GlobalGAP.  
The stakeholders participating to the above mentioned workshop of 2006 agreed that the value 
chain needed a new rule to enhance traceability. The “Direction des Normes et de la Qualité” 
(DNQ) of the Ministry for Trade and the “Direction du Développement des Partenariats” (DDP) of 
the Ministry for Agriculture led the editing committee. The Government enacted a law (18 
November 2006 “Arrêté ministeriel portant organisation de la filière litchi”) for training and 
registration of consolidators, eg collectors and middlemen (BAMEX, annual report 2007, p. 
5). 
In 2007, the PCL launched the Litchi Action Plan (in reference to the Madagascar Action 
Plan): one of the measures taken into account is that of enhancing traceability by monitoring 
the activities of the rural brokers who deliver lychee to fumigation plants. This evolution 
towards registration and professionalization of brokers represents an important step towards 
the monitoring of procurement for exporters. 
In 2007, BAMEX support consisted in lobbying on behalf of exporters for financial support of 
the IFC. The funding was intended for the acquisition of technical assistance to comply with 
GlobalGAP requirements and certification. Thus, twelve exporters marketed their litchis supported by 
GlobalGAP certificates, thanks to the financial support received from the IFC (Bamex, annual report, 
2008, p.4). The funding was used to hire an external consultant who helped exporters setting the 
quality management procedures necessary for GlobalGAP certification: the costs of the physical 
investment (collection points, sheds, improvement of fumigation and packing plants) were supported 
by the exporters (Samb, 2007). MCA bears the costs of certification for the season 2007/2008 
(MCA, 2008). 
As regards support to organize the procurement system (certification under GlobalGAP option 
2), PPRR and BAMEX helped exporters to get in touch with the producers organizations they 
developed in the framework of their general rural development policy (PPRR, 2007 p.23; 
BAMEX, external evaluation, 2009, p.37). Direct contracting between producers and 
exporters was promoted, their marketing structures (respectively MACs and BCIs) providing 
administrative help for the writing of contracts.  
 
2.4.4  Achievements and the donors’ withdrawal 
 
• From the donors’ perspective   
 
The final SWOT analysis of BAMEX (External evaluation, 2009, p.37) doesn’t report the 
intervention in the lychee chain as a success. It concludes on the difficulties for operators “to 
commit thoroughly to market requirements”. Furthermore, it viewed the involvement of 
members of the exporters’ association as weak (“weak capacities”, External evaluation, 2009, 
p.11) – the same statement is made by the CTHT in its report to Stabex (CTHT, 2006-2007, 
p.12) when referring to the governance difficulties of the association. Moreover, the same 
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report underlines that the explicit goal of the exporter association is to control the marketing 
of lychees (setting volumes, bargaining for a fixed price) and not the upgrading of the chain 
that should insure a stable access to the European market and thus benefit the whole 
profession.  
BAMEX decided to transfer the management of BCIs to the MCA in order to strengthen its 
system of ABCs, but zoning choices, sectors and structures didn’t match. BCIs were left 
behind even with the willingness of BAMEX to secure the transition of the established 
institutions towards their autonomy, and the publicity the program made for it: the political 
unrest and financial shortage in Madagascar since the spring 2009 made the sustainability of 
the program achievements uncertain.  
BAMEX, specialized in the promotion of marketing, reports coordination difficulties with the 
program ERI, in charge with the production level. More integrated programs like PPRR 
managed to let the marketing structures (MACs) be administrated by producers associations 
even though they remained separated structures. 
 
In August 2009, MCA left prematurely Madagascar after the coup, and the investments 
planed in the report of 2008, namely the first one specifically targeting sectors and proposing 
interventions, were only marginally realized.  
PPRR promoted the production and marketing of only a few hundred tons of certified lychees 
through the MAC (PPRR, 2007). Moreover, as soon as 2008, the question of the GlobalGAP 
certification nearly disappeared from the reports (2 occurrences, only).  
PIP-COLEACP is still promoting good agricultural practices, and the secured management of 
procurement by exporters. The training of the CTHT professionals allows the CTHT to still 
propose consulting for upgrading and external auditing for GlobalGAP certification. 
 
• GlobalGAP dynamics 
 
Table 1. Number of certified exporters and producers in Madagascar for lychee  
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
GlobalGap option 1 0 1 4 4 
GlobalGap option 2 2 12 7 7 
GlobalGap total 2 13 11 11 
New entrants 2 11 0 0 
Drop out 0 0 2 0 
Switch from option 0 0 4 0 
Total number of 
exporters 
37 ns ns 25 
Number of certified 
producers 
4127 119824 ns 12025 
                                                 
24
 MCA, 2008, annex, p. 239 
25
 According to certification bodies and exporters’ interviews. 
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Volumes certified 300 t 2,000 t26 ns 600 t27 
 
The total number of exporters is decreasing over the period from, 37 during the campaign 
2005/06 to 25 in 2009/10 and then stabilized until 2010: a consolidation of intermediation is 
observable. The peak in the intervention of donors coincides with the highest number of 
producers engaged in GlobalGAP. As soon as 2008/09, 4 exporters switched to option 1 
certification. There orchards are however relatively small and they report no more than 5% of 
the produce they handle as GlobalGAP certified, namely their own production. However, they 
are procuring from the same producers as those formerly GlobalGAP certified.  
This evolution induces a sharp reduction in the number of GlobalGAP certified producers, as 
well as a reduction in the volumes of GlobalGAP certified produce.  This is contrasting the 
Senegalese and Kenyan cases where the number of producers is decreasing, but the volumes 
of certified produce is maintained thanks to the integration of production on large-scale farms 
by down-stream operators. 
 
Conclusion: What is left?  
 
This study of the dynamics of GlobalGAP certification in the case of lychees in Madagascar, 
namely, the only Malagasy product that is currently GlobalGAP certified, shows that the 
donors’ intervention is decisive. Donors help coordinating operators along the chain, alleviate 
the financial constraints of small producers as well as that of intermediary firms, accessing 
further international funding related to trade promotion.  
Madagascar represents an interesting case study because donors left the country after the coup 
of March 2009, sometimes unexpectedly. The question of the sustainability of their 
intervention can then be touched upon. We conclude on a sharp drop in certification as 
regards GlobalGAP after the withdrawal of donors. 
However, the results shows that GlobalGAP promotion was only one among a bunch of 
interventions aiming at promoting market access for small-holders. Moreover, side-effects of 
certification (Henson et al., 2011) are observed. We identified an evolution of the exporters 
procurement system with a stabilization of the relationship to the producers and thus enhanced 
traceability, an upgrading of the private marketing infrastructures and an improvement of the 
management discipline.  
This conclusion leads to the idea that, in this case, GlobalGAP has little impact on market 
access but that its implementation has side-effects that benefit small producers.  
 
                                                 
26
 MCA, 2008 
27
 Interviews with exporters, estimated. 
16 
 
References 
Asfaw, S., D. Mithöfer, and H. Waibel. 2010, “What impact are EU supermarket standards having 
on developing countries export of High-value horticultural products? Evidence from Kenya” Journal 
of International Food and Agribusiness Marketing, 22(3-4): 252-276 
Ashraf N., X. Gine, D. Karlan, 2009, "Finding Missing Markets (and a Disturbing Epilogue): 
Evidence from an Export Crop Adoption and Marketing Intervention in Kenya." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 91(4): 973-990. 
Cadot O., L. Dutoit, J. de Melo, 2008, “The elimination of Madagascar’s vanilla marketing board, 
ten years on”, EUDN Working Paper, 2008-05. 
CITE, 2008, “Phase II : Enquêtes filières Filière Litchi Madagascar”, Programme RuralStruc, EPP-
PADR / MAEP-UPDR, Banque Mondiale, SAHA InterCooperation, Coopération Française, APB 
Consulting. 
Diaz Rios, L., , S. Jaffee, S. Henson, and J. Mugisha, 2009, “Not quite up to standard: The legacy 
of two decades of government and donor assistance to Uganda’s horticultural export sector”, 
Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper. World Bank. Washington, DC.  
Dolan, C., and J. Humphrey, 2000, “Governance and trade in fresh vegetables: impact of UK 
supermarkets on the African horticulture industry”, Journal of Development Studies, 37(2): 147-76. 
Dolan C, J. Humphrey and C. Harris-Pascal, 1999, “Horticulture commodity chains: the impact of 
the UK market on the African fresh vegetable industry”, IDS Working Paper, 96. Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies. 
Fulponi L., 2006, “Private voluntary standards in the food system: The perspective of major food 
retailers in OECD countries”, Food Policy, 31 (1): 1–13. 
Gerbeaud P., 2008, “Le dossier du mois : litchi”, Fruitrop, 156. 
Gerbeaud P., 2010, “Suivi de la campagne de commercialisation du litchi de Madagascar sur les 
marchés européens”, MinAgri, CTHT-CTCP, UE : Tamatave. http://www.ctht.org/bilancamp.php (last 
accessed August 2011) 
Gereffi G., 1994, “The organization of buyer-driven global commodity chains: How US retailers 
shape overseas production networks”, in G. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz, eds, Commodity Chains and 
Global Capitalism. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Graffam A., E. Karehu and J. MacGregor, 2007, “Impact of EurepGap on smallscale producers in 
Kenya”, Fresh Insights, 6, London: IIED. 
Henson, S. J. and J. Caswell, 1999, “Food safety regulation: An overview of contemporary issues”, 
Food Policy, 24(6), p. 589–603. 
Henson, S. and Humphrey, J., 2010, “Understanding the complexities of private standards in global 
agri-food chains as they impact developing countries”, Journal of Development Studies 46 (9): 1628-
46. 
Henson, S. and T. Reardon, 2005, “Private Agri-Food Standards: Implications for Food Policy and 
the Agri-Food System”, Food Policy, 30 (3): 241-253. 
Henson, S., O. Masakure and J. Cranfield, 2011, “Do fresh produce exporters in Sub-Saharan 
Africa benefit from GlobalGAP certification”, World Development, 39(3): 375-386. 
Humphrey, J. and Navas-Alemán, L., 2010, “Value Chains, Donor Interventions and Poverty 
Reduction: A Review of Donor Practice”, IDS Research Report 63. 
Humphrey J. and H. Schmitz, 2002, “Developing country firms in the world economy: governance 
and upgrading in global value chains”, INEF Report. 
17 
 
IIED and NRI, 2008, “Costs and benefits of GlobalGAP compliance for smallholders: Synthesized 
findings” International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the Natural Resource 
Institute (NRI), Fresh Perspectives. 
http://www.agrifoodstandards.net/en/resources/global/fresh_perspectives_7_costs_and_benefits_of
_globalgap_compliance_for_smallholders_synthesised_findings (last accessed August 2011) 
Jaffee, S. and S. Henson, 2004, “Standards and agro-food exports from developing countries: 
Rebalancing the debate”, Policy Research Working Paper 3348, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Jaud M. and O. Cadot, 2011, “A second look at the pesticides initiative program: evidence from 
Senegal”, Policy Resaerch Working Paper 5635, The World Bank 
Loader R. and J. Hobbs, 1999, “Strategic responses to food safety legislation”, Food Policy, 24 (6), 
p. 685–706 
Maertens, M., and J. Swinnen. 2009, “Trade, Standards and Poverty: Evidence from Senegal”, 
World Development, 161-178. 
Ministère de l’Agriculture de l’Elevage et de la Pêche (MAEP), 2004, “La filière litchi”, UPDR- 
Ocean Consulting, Antananarivo. 
www.inter-reseaux.org/IMG/pdf_107_Filiere_Litchi.pdf (last accessed August 2011) 
Maret F., 2007, “Distortions to agricultural incentives in Madagascar”, Agricultural Distortions 
Working Paper 53, World Bank. 
Mausch K., D. Mithöfer, S. Asfaw, H. Waibel, 2009 “Export vegetable production in Kenya under 
the EurepGAP standard: Is large “more beautiful” than small?”, Journal of Food Distribution 
Research 40(3): 115-129. 
Minten, B., L. Randrianarison and J. Swinnen, 2009 “Global retail chains and poor farmers: 
Evidence from Madagascar”, World Development, 37(11): 1728-1741 
Minot, N. Ngigi, M., 2004, “Are Horticultural Exports a Replicable Success Story? Evidence from 
Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire”, Environment and Production Technology Division and Markets Trade and 
Institutions Division, Washington, IFPRI  
Okello, J. S. Swinton, 2007, “Compliance with international food safety standards in Kenya's green 
bean industry: Comparison of a small- and a large-scale farm producing for export”, Review of 
Agricultural Economics, 29 (2): 269-285 
Razafindrakoto, M., Roubaud, F., 2002, “Les entreprises franches à Madagascar: Atouts et 
contraintes d’une insertion réussie”, Afrique Contemporaine, 202–203, 147–163. 
Reardon T. and C. Timmer, 2007, “Transformation of markets for agricultural output in developing 
countries since 1950: How has thinking changed?”, In R. Evenson, P. Pingali, et T.P. Schultz (Eds), 
Handbook of Agricultural Economics. North Holland : Elsevier 
Rouvière E., R. Soubeyran, C. Bignebat, 2010, “Heterogenous efforts in voluntary programmes on 
food safety”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 37 (4): 479-499. 
Samb, B., 2007. “Programme d’Accompagnement à la Certification GLOBALGAP d’entreprises 
membres du Groupement des Exportateurs de Litchis (GEL) ”, Tamatave -Madagascar: BIOSCOPE 
SARL Expertise qualité. 
Sandri D., E. Valenzuela, K. Anderson, 2007, “Economic and trade indicators for Africa, 1960 to 
2004”, Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 21, World Bank 
Sturgeon, T., 2009, “From commodity chains to value chains: Interdisciplinary theory building in 
an age of globalization”, in J. Bair (ed.), Frontiers of commodity chain research  Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press: 110-135. 
Swinnen J., S. Rozelle, T. Xiang, T. Vandemoortele, 2008, "A Theory of Standards-Driven Rural 
Development," LICOS Discussion Papers 19908, LICOS: Leuven 
18 
 
Unnevehr, L., 2000, “Food Safety Issues and Fresh Food Product Exports from LDCs”, 
Agricultural Economics, 23 (3): 231–40. 
Weinberger, K. and Lumpkin, T., 2007, “Diversification into horticulture and poverty reduction: A 
research agenda”, World Development, 35 (8), p. 1464-1480. 
 
19 
 
Appendix 1: data and sources  
 
 
Summaries of the trends on the lychee European market (“la lettre du litchi”) are published on 
a weekly basis during the harvesting and marketing period of Malagasy lychees by the Centre 
Technique Horticole de Tamatave (CTHT). They cover 9 campaigns, from 2001-02 until 
2009-2010. They summarize the supply of Malagasy and South African lychees (air freighted 
volumes, arrivals of boats including their name, tonnage and docking harbour). They report 
the Cost Insurance Fret (CIF) prices on various European markets (Belgium, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) and describe the observed market dynamics in these 
countries plus Italy and Spain. They include pictures of the delivered lychees aiming at stating 
their quality.  
For the whole period 2001-2010 except for the campaign 2007-08, reports were published by 
the CTHT that entail a more precise description of the yearly functioning of the lychee 
marketing channel. In particular, the upstream segments are described: production, 
transactions and transportation in Madagascar, loading of the boats. 
http://ns5.freeheberg.com/~archives/litchi/bilan/ (last accessed October 2010) 
http://www.ctht.org/litchi.php (last accessed October 2010) 
 
Data come from semi-structured in depth executive interviews in April, May and June 2010 
with a range of Managing Directors from key importing (3 French and German firms) and 
exporting (11 Malagasy firms) firms. The aim of the interviews was to gather information on 
the firms’ characteristics, on the contractual relationships with their buyers and suppliers, and 
identify the key problems they encounter. Interviews with government agencies and programs 
supporting lychee production and marketing were also undertaken to explore their 
relationships with exporters and producers. On average, each interview lasted over one hour, 
and firm visits were sometimes possible. For confidentiality reasons, the identities of 
organisations are withheld. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Madagascar, lychee production area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source : AVSF, 
2005 
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Appendix 3: Donors’ reports  
 
UE (COM STABEX 96/97/98/99), reports 1998, 2006/07, 2007/08, 2008/09 
http://www.ctht.org/bilans.php  
PPRR (IFAD), reports 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 
http://www.pprr.mg/spip.php?article75 (last accessed August 2011) 
PPRR 2007, “Etude de cas, filière litchi, Madagascar”, MAEP, CAPFIDA, PPRR 
www.capfida.mg/km/site_spip/IMG/pdf/Etude_de_cas_LITCHI-2.pdf (last accessed August 
2011) 
MCA, inception report 2006, reports 2006, 2007, 2008 (main text + annex), audit report 2007 
http://www.agrifoodconsulting.com/ACI/index.php?action=detail&id=11 (last accessed 
August 2011) 
BAMEX-USAID, implementation plan (2004-2005), report 2005-2006, report 2006-2007, 
report 2007-2008, final report 2004-2008, external evaluation 2009  
http://www.usaid.gov/ (last accessed August 2011) 
Assessment of lychee fruit expansion 2005 
http://www.cite.mg/basdoc/fichiersliens/Lychee%20BAMEX.pdf  
ColeACP (PIP) 
Report, Septembre 2002: “Réalisation d’une carte des filières horticoles d’exportation à 
Madagascar (litchis et haricots verts) ”, CITE, CTHT, PSFH 
www.cite.mg/basdoc/fichiersliens/RF_coleacp.doc (last accessed August 2011) 
Report, Septembre 2003: “Mission PIP de coordination : Missions à Madagascar auprès des 
structures intermédiaires”, Christophe Raoelina  
http://www.jca-institut.com/2010/09/07/missions-a-madagascar-aupres-des-structures-
intermediaires/#more-780 (last accessed August 2011) 
PIP Info, n° 19, Novembre 2003 “Madagascar: Preliminary study on the feasibility of 
EUREPGAP certification” 
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Appendix 4: Donor interventions in the lychee sector 
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28
 Système de Stabilisation des Exportations, EU compensatory finance scheme to stabilise export earnings of 
the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries. 
29
 Programme d’intensification de la production et de la structuration professionnelle 
23 
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